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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

ROLAND HOLMAN, an individual
dba Andersen's Ford, Inc.,
and Andersen's Ford, Inc., a
Utah corporation,

]
]
]
]
I

Case No. 940486-CA

Plaintiffs and Appellants,]
vs.

]

CALLISTER, DUNCAN & NEBEKER, ')
fka GREENE, CALLISTER &
]
NEBEKER, a Utah Professional
Corporation,
]

Priority No. 15

Defendant and Appellee.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including
jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over: (j) orders, judgments,
and decrees of any court of record over which the Court of Appeals
does not have original appellate jurisdiction.
78-2-2.

Utah Code Ann. §

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
POINT I
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN RULING THAT A CLAIM
AGAINST A DISSOLVED CORPORATION WHICH OCCURS MORE
THAN TWO YEARS AFTER THE DATE OF DISSOLUTION IS,
AS A MATTER OF LAW, BARRED UNDER THE PROVISIONS
§16-10-100 UTAH CODE ANN., (1953 as amended)?
POINT II
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN RULING THAT PLAINTIFF
ROLAND HOLMAN, AS A MATTER OF LAW, COULD NOT BE A
PROPER PARTY PLAINTIFF TO BRING THIS LEGAL
MALPRACTICE ACTION?
Applicable Standard of Appellate Review:
Both of the issues are questions of law that this Court
reviews for correctness giving no deference to the trial court's
conclusions.

This Court will affirm a trial court's decision to

grant a motion to dismiss only if it appears the plaintiff cannot
prove any set of facts in support of its claim.

Dansie v. Anderson

Lumber Co., et al. f 243 Ut. Adv. Rep. 18.
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES,
ORDINANCES AND RULES
Constitutional Provisions:
Article I, section 11 of the Utah Constitution provides:
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an
injury done to him in his person, property or
reputation, shall have remedy by due course of
law, which shall be administered without denial or
unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred
from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal
in this state, by himself or counsel any civil
cause to which he is a party.

2

Statutes:
Former Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-100 provided:
The dissolution of a corporation . . . shall not
take away or impair any remedy available to or
against the corporation . . . for any right or
claim existing, or any liability incurred prior to
such dissolution if action or other proceeding
thereon is commenced within two years after the
date of such dissolution.
Former Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-101 provided:
Notwithstanding the dissolution of a corporation .
. . the corporate existence of such corporation
shall nevertheless continue for the purpose of
winding up its affairs . . . and to effect such
purpose such corporation may . . . sue and be
sued.
Former
provided:

Utah

Code

Ann.

§

16-10a-1405

(enacted

1992)

(2) Dissolution of a corporation does not:
(e) prevent commencement of a proceeding by
or against the corporation in its corporate name.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.

These cases involve a claim

against the defendant Callister, Duncan & Nebeker fka Greene,
Callister & Nebeker, a Utah professional corporation, for legal
malpractice which occurred during a Chapter 11 proceeding in the
United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah.
Plaintiffs allege in their respective Complaints that
defendant committed legal malpractice when it negligently failed to
incorporate as part of the record in the Bankruptcy Court a
settlement agreement between Andersen's Ford, Inc. and the Internal
Revenue Service ("IRS"), a creditor in the bankruptcy case.

3

B.

Course of Proceedings.

Andersen's Ford, Inc., civil

Case No. 93090413, was assigned to the Honorable Leslie A. Lewis,
Judge of the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake
County, State of Utah. The defendant did not file an answer to the
Complaint to dispute the merits of the case, but instead, filed a
Motion to Dismiss and/or Motion for Summary Judgment.

In its

memorandum, defendant contended the case should be dismissed
because under the provisions of §16-10-100, Utah Code Ann., (1953
as amended), Andersen's Ford, Inc. as a dissolved corporation was
required to file this action within two years of the date of order
of dissolution, and this case was filed more than two years after
the date of dissolution.

Defendant further argued that as a

dissolved corporation, Andersen's Ford, Inc. ceased to exist,
consequently, the plaintiff had no standing to bring an action
against defendant for legal malpractice.
In response to these claims, plaintiff

contended the

provisions of §16-10-101 Utah Code Ann., (1953 as amended), which
did not provide for any time limitation, was applicable to this
case because the bankruptcy proceeding could be considered as part
of the "winding up" of the affairs of the corporation.

Plaintiff

further asserted that §16-10-100 became a statute of repose because
the cause of action in this case did not occur until after the two
year period, and therefore, the statute unconstitutionally deprived
it of

its cause of

action.

Plaintiff

also contended

that

defendant, as attorney for Andersen's Ford, Inc. was estopped from
asserting this statute as a defense to a legal malpractice claim.
4

The case of Roland Holman, an individual, dba Andersen's
Ford, Inc., civil Case No. 940090147, was assigned to the Honorable
David S. Young, Judge of the Third Judicial District Court in and
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah.

As in the previous case,

defendant did not file an answer to the Complaint to dispute the
merits of the case, but instead, filed a Motion to Dismiss and/or
Motion for Summary Judgment.
In its memorandum, defendant contended Andersen's Ford,
Inc. was the client of the law firm, and therefore, the real party
in interest.

Defendant then argued that if Andersen's Ford, Inc.

was determined to be the real party in interest in the case, then
the case must be dismissed on the grounds of res

judicata

based on

the decision rendered by Judge Lewis.
In response to this argument, plaintiff who had been doing
business as Andersen's Ford, Inc., contended he was at least a
successor in interest to any claim for legal malpractice. Further,
that defendant was, in fact, also representing plaintiff Holman in
the bankruptcy proceeding.
C.

Disposition of the Trial Court.

Judge Lewis, on

November 1, 1993, entered a ruling that plaintiff's claim arose
after dissolution stating that, fl[T]his Court cannot conclude that
'windup' actions include initiative litigation."

The Court, on

December 21, entered an Order dismissing the case with prejudice.
Judge Young granted the Motion to Dismiss, or in the
Alternative Summary Judgment, and on May 5, 1994, entered an Order
dismissing the case with prejudice.
5

It is the granting of these Motions to Dismiss which is the
subject of this appeal.
D.

Statement of Facts Relevant to Issues Presented for

Review.
Plaintiff Andersen's Ford, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as
the "Company") was a family corporation organized under the laws of
the State of Utah, and was engaged in the business of owning and
operating a retail Ford automobile dealership in Brigham City,
Utah.

(Addendum B)
Plaintiff

Roland

Holman

(hereinafter

referred

to

as

"Holman") was the president of the Company, and with the exception
of a few shares in his family name, was the majority stockholder of
the Company.
The defendant (hereinafter referred to as "Callister") was
an association of lawyers authorized to practice law in the State
of Utah, and maintained its offices in Salt Lake City, Utah.
defendant was the attorney

for both the Company

The

and Holman

personally.
On September

30, 1982, the Company was involuntarily

dissolved by the State of Utah for failure to pay state taxes.
After the Order of Dissolution, the Company was not dissolved, but
Holman, as president of the Company, continued to operate the
business under the name of Andersen's Ford, Inc., and continued to
use the defendant as its attorneys.

(Holman record, pp. 107-108)

Beginning in January 1979, the Company experienced severe financial
problems and became indebted to the Internal Revenue Service
6

(hereinafter referred to as "IRS") for delinquent withholding taxes
for the years 1980, 1981, and 1982.

Holman, as president of the

Company, was jointly liable with the Company to pay these taxes.
(Addendum B)
During the latter part of 1982 and into the early part of
1983, the IRS kept demanding immediate payment of these taxes and
threatened to seize the assets of both the Company and Holman to
pay these taxes.

In light of the IRS7

activity, Callister

recommended filing a Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding in the
Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah.

The attorney advised

Holman that such procedure would stop the IRS from attempting to
collect the delinquent taxes, and allow the delinquent taxes to be
paid under the supervision of the United States Bankruptcy Court.
(Andersen record, pp. 81-82)
Holman, as president of the company, and individually,
agreed to proceed. Accordingly, on May 2, 1993, defendant filed in
the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah, a
Chapter 11 proceeding in the name of Andersen's Ford, Inc., debtor,
Case No. 83C-01222.

Holman, as president of the Company, signed

the Petition. Holman paid the filing expenses and attorneys' fees
by check drawn on a bank account maintained in the name of
Andersen's Ford, Inc.
The IRS was designated as a creditor and filed a claim in
the amount of $154,004.83, which was later amended to $127,403.09.
These claims were disputed.
Court,

defendant

filed

Following the rules of the Bankruptcy
a

Plan
7

of

Reorganization

for

the

continuation of the business operations of the Company.

The Plan

provided in part that the claim of the IRS, the amount of which was
not mentioned inasmuch as it had not been determined, would be paid
over a period of five (5) years.
After the Plan of Reorganization had been approved, a
settlement was reached with the IRS for an amount of approximately
$56,000, which represented payment in full of the delinquent taxes,
interest, and

penalties.

The

terms

and

conditions

of

the

settlement are set forth in a letter dated November 4, 1984, signed
by IRS Agent Hilton.
The attorneys representing plaintiffs failed to include the
settlement with the IRS as part of the record of the Bankruptcy
Court by either incorporating the amount of the settlement in the
Plan of Reorganization or by filing an appropriate petition or
motion to obtain
settlement.

approval

from the Bankruptcy

Court of the

As a result of this failure, the IRS, by letter to

Holman dated October 27, 1990, demanded an additional amount of
approximately $122,000 for payment of the taxes, interest, and
penalties.
Holman was unable to settle this claim with the IRS, and in
order to resolve the matter, he was required to retain the services
of another law firm in Salt Lake City to represent the Company and
Holman in the bankruptcy case since Holman needed Callister as a
witness to the negotiated settlement.

This new law firm filed an

adversary proceeding against the IRS seeking an order of the
Bankruptcy Court enjoining the IRS from asserting this new claim on
8

the grounds and for the reasons that the IRS was bound by the terms
and conditions of the settlement letter dated November 2, 1984.
(Addendum B and C)
After a bench trial, the Bankruptcy Judge, on December 23,
1991, entered a decision in favor of the Company, with the
exception of assessing an additional $21,000 taxes. (Andersen
record, p. 40) The IRS appealed this decision to the United States
District Court for the District of Utah, which appeal was denied on
the June 4, 1992. Thereafter, the IRS filed a Notice of Appeal, in
the United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit, which was
finally withdrawn by the IRS on August 17, 1992.

The bankruptcy

case was ultimately closed in August of 1992.
Plaintiffs then filed these lawsuits against the defendant
alleging that defendant committed legal malpractice on or about
November 2, 1984, when defendant negligently failed to incorporate
in the record of the Bankruptcy Court the settlement agreement
entered into with the IRS. Plaintiffs claimed that as a proximate
result of this malpractice, they were damaged in the sum of
$96,000, which represented $75,000 for the attorneys' fees and
accountants' costs, and $21,000 assessed as additional taxes.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The legal malpractice action against Callister could have
been brought by either Andersen's Ford, Inc. or Roland Holman. The
trial courts erred in granting defendant's Motions to Dismiss.
In dismissing the case, Judge Lewis failed to make findings
of fact which reflected the basis for the Court dismissing the
9

case.

The Court rejected the claim of plaintiff that the action

against the defendant should be controlled by the provisions of
§16-10-100.

Therefore, the Court must have relied upon the two

year limitation in §16-10-100 in dismissing the case.

The claim

having arisen after the expiration of the two years, makes the
enforcement

of

the

unconstitutional

statute

under

a

Statute

Article

I,

of

Section

Repose,
11

of

and

thus

the

Utah

Constitution.
The defendant law firm is charged with knowledge of the
provisions

of

§16-10-100, and

in

particular,

its

two

year

limitation. The defendant was aware the Corporation was dissolved,
and that the impact of its representation
proceeding

would

far

exceed

the

two

in the bankruptcy

years.

Under

such

circumstances, the defendant is legally and ethically barred from
claiming the statute as a defense for legal malpractice which arose
after the two years

as a result of defendant's

negligent

performance of its duties in the Bankruptcy Court.
The trial court erred in ruling that Holman could not be a
proper party plaintiff.

The Utah Supreme Court has found that

"[E]ven in the absence of an express attorney-client relationship,
circumstances may give rise to an implied professional relationship
or a fiduciary duty toward the client, thereby invoking the ethical
mandates governing the practice of law." Margulies by Margulies v.
Upchurch, 696 P.2d 1195 (Utah 1985). Reaching this conclusion, the
Court cited

Hutton

& Co v. Brown, 305 F.Supp.

371, 387-92

(S.D.Tex.1971), in which the Federal Court implied a professional
10

relationship where an officer of a corporation reasonably believed
that an attorney

had represented

disclaimed any such relationship.

him, although the attorney
The trial court erred when it

dismissed the Holman case without first hearing whether there was
an attorney-client relationship and then make appropriate findings
of fact and conclusions of law.1
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT A CLAIM
AGAINST A DISSOLVED CORPORATION WHICH OCCURS MORE
THAN TWO YEARS AFTER THE DATE OF DISSOLUTION IS,
AS A MATTER OF LAW, BARRED UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF
FORMER §16-10-100 UTAH CODE ANN., (1953 as
amended).
Article I Section 11 Declares That an Individual Shall Have
a Right to a "Remedy by Due Course of Law" For Injury to "Person,
Propertyf or Reputation".

Specifically, that section states:

All courts shall be open, and every person, for an
injury done to him in his person, property or
reputation, shall have remedy by due course of
law, which shall be administered without denial or
unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred
from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal
in this state, by himself or counsel any civil
cause to which he is a party.
The injury involved in this case is the damages resulting
from the legal malpractice committed by Callister in the Bankruptcy
Court.

The injury occurred on November 4, 1984, while Callister

1

Whether there was an attorney-client relationship is a
question of fact that cannot properly be disposed of by summary
judgment. U.R.C.P. 56. As stated in the facts, it is unclear
whether the trial court granted the defendants motion to dismiss
or motion for summary judgment. Since there were questions of fact
presented, plaintiff proceeds under the assumption that the court
granted a motion to dismiss.
11

was acting as counsel for the debtor Andersen Ford, Inc. in the
United

States

Bankruptcy

Court.

Unfortunately,

malpractice was not discovered on that date.

this

legal

As in many cases,

malpractice is not discovered until years after its occurrence.
In this case, the parties and all creditors were subject to
the

jurisdiction

of the Bankruptcy

Court under the Plan of

Reorganization the defendant had filed with the Court. It was only
after completion of the plan that afforded creditors, such as the
IRS, the opportunity to make demands upon the debtor.

These

demands by the IRS were determined to be invalid after protracted
litigation in August 1992.

It was after this time, that the

plaintiffs had knowledge of the malpractice committed over twelve
years previous.
Having discovered the malpractice, plaintiff Andersen's
Ford, Inc. filed its action in the District Court on July 14, 1993.
The trial court ruled, however, that the claim is barred because it
was not filed within two years of the date of dissolution of the
corporation. This date would be May 1984, some six months prior to
the malpractice act.

Consequently, the Court, in dismissing the

case, has violated the constitutional rights of the parties.
Former

Utah

Code

Ann.

§§16-10-100

unconstitutional as applied by Judge Lewis.

In

and

101

are

Berry

by

and

through Berry v. Beech Aircraft, 717 P. 2d 670 (Utah 1985), the Utah
Supreme Court explained that Section 11 was designed to accomplish
several purposes which include access to the courts and a judicial
procedure that is based on fairness and equality.
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The Court

acknowledged that the framers intended that an individual cannot be
arbitrarily deprived of effective remedies designed to protect his
basic individual rights.
Although this provision of the Utah Constitution has thus
far been interpreted in the area of statutes of repose and statutes
of limitations (see: Berry, supra, and Brown v. Weis, 871 P.2d 552
(Utah 1994)) the reasoning is equally applicable to this factual
scenario.

As the Court discussed in Berryf "no one has a vested

right in any rule of law." Id. at 675.
However, once a cause of action under a particular
rule of law accrues to a person by virtue of an
injury to his rights, that person's interest in
the cause of action and the law which is the basis
for a legal action becomes vested, and a
legislative
repeal
of
the
law
cannot
constitutionally divest the injured person of the
right to litigate the cause of action to a
judgment. Id. at 676.
The defendant's argument appears to be that since the
cause of action (legal malpractice) did not occur until two years
after the corporation was dissolved, the corporation is estopped
from seeking redress for its injury.

The defendant then argues

that the president of the dissolved corporation who is jointly
liable for the damages caused by the defendant's negligence is
estopped from seeking redress for his injury because the defendant
denies that plaintiff enjoyed an attorney-client relationship with
the defendant. This circular argument would serve to insulate the
entire legal profession from legal malpractice claims made as a
result

of

negligent

services

corporations.
13

rendered

to

now

dissolved

When Judge Lewis dismissed this case in reliance on former
§16-10-100 or 101, those statutes became statutes of repose. Under
Article I, Section 11, a statute of repose is unconstitutional
unless it can survive the two part analysis set forth in Berry by
and through Berry v. Beech Aircraft, 717 P.2d at 680 (Utah 1985).
In Berryf the Court set forth a two-part analysis to
determine whether the legislation abrogating a right properly
accommodated Section 11.
First, Section 11 is satisfied if the law provides
an injured person an effective and reasonable
alternative remedy "by due course of law" for
vindication of his constitutional interest. The
benefit
provided
by
the
substitute
must
substantially equal in value or other benefit to
the remedy abrogated in providing essentially
comparable substantive protection to one's person,
property, or reputation, although the form of the
substitute remedy may be different.
Second, if there is no substitute or alternative
remedy provided, abrogation of the remedy or cause
of action may be justified only if there is a
clear social or economic evil to be eliminated and
the elimination of an existing legal remedy is not
an arbitrary or unreasonable means for achieving
the objective. Berry by and through Berry v. Beech
Aircraft, 717 P.2d 670, 680 (Utah 1985).
Under the Berry analysis, defendant's argument that the
plaintiff is estopped from bringing the cause of action because the
corporation has been dissolved or, in the alternative, because the
president of that corporation does not have an attorney-client
relationship must fail. First, the defendant's negligence occurred
during the course of its representation of the Company and of
Holman.

However, the plaintiff's cause of action did not arise

until several years later when the IRS demanded additional monies
14

and it became known that Callister had failed to incorporate the
negotiated settlement into the bankruptcy proceeding.

Chapter 16

Utah Code Ann. as it existed until 19922 did not provide a
substitute remedy for a cause of action that arose after the twoyear winding up period.
Second, the Legislature must have had a clear social or
economic evil it sought to eliminate when it abrogated the cause of
action.
order

It is here that the defendant's argument and the Court
fails

because

insulating

attorneys

from

legitimate

malpractice suits does not eliminate a clear social or economic
evil.

In fact, defendant must be legally and ethically estopped

from asserting the provisions of former Section 16-10-100, Utah
code Ann. as a defense to legal malpractice.
Callister acknowledges that it was retained for the purpose
of representing Andersen's Ford, Inc. in its reorganization under
a Chapter 11 proceeding in the United States Bankruptcy Court, and
that it prepared that Chapter 11 plan.

All during this period,

defendant was aware of the dissolution of the corporation and had
assured Holman that this did not affect its reorganization.
As previously noted, the confirmed Plan of Reorganization
prepared by Callister provided for ongoing activities of the
corporation rather than a liquidation of the corporation. The Plan
specifically provided that the claim of the IRS could be paid over
2

At the time the cause of action was filed, the statutory
scheme had changed and now provided that corporate dissolution did
not "prevent commencement of a proceeding by or against the
corporation in its corporate name." Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a1405(2)(e).
15

a period

of five years, long after the two year period of

limitations as set forth in former §16-10-100. If reinstatement of
the corporation was necessary to protect plaintiff, then Callister
should have made arrangements for such reinstatement.
It is respectfully submitted that under such circumstances,
and with the knowledge Callister had regarding the limitations in
the statute, and that its duties would exceed the two years
mentioned therein, is legally and ethically estopped from claiming
the statute affords a defense to this legal malpractice claim. It
would be inequitable for Callister to now take advantage of
Andersen's Ford, Inc. and claim a statute protects Callister from
a legal malpractice claim.

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT PLAINTIFF
ROLAND HOLMAN, AS A MATTER OF LAW, COULD NOT BE A
PROPER PARTY PLAINTIFF TO BRING THIS LEGAL
MALPRACTICE ACTION.
The case of Andersen's Ford, Inc. against Callister having
been dismissed, and Judge Lewis, having failed to rule on the
motion to substitute Roland Holman as party plaintiff, Roland
Holman filed his action against Callister on January 7, 1994.
Since the dissolution of Andersen's Ford, Inc. in September
of

1982, Holman had been doing business under the name of

Andersen's Ford, Inc. with the knowledge and blessing of Callister.
Callister advised Holman that filing Chapter 11 Bankruptcy would
stop the IRS's attempts to collect delinquent taxes, for which both
Holman and the Company were jointly liable, and would allow the
16

taxes to be paid under the supervision of the United States
Bankruptcy Court.

Holman, individually and as president of the

Company, agreed to this procedure.

(Addendum B, p. 2; Anderson

record, p. 101, par. 2.11)
Holman respectfully submits that under such circumstances,
it was error for Judge Young to rule, as a matter of law, that
Holman was not a proper party plaintiff. Contrary to Judge Young's
ruling, the Utah Supreme Court has held, an attorney/client
relationship can arise through implication.
In Margulies by Margulies v. Upchurch. 696 P.2d 1195 (Utah
1985) states: "[E]ven in the absence of an express attorney-client
relationship,

circumstances

may

give

rise

to

an

implied

professional relationship or a fiduciary duty toward the client,
thereby invoking the ethical mandates governing the practice of
law."

Reaching this conclusion, the Court cited Hutton & Co v.

Brown, 305 F.Supp. 371, 387-92 (S.D.Tex.1971) in which the Federal
Court implied a professional relationship where an officer of a
corporation reasonably believed that an attorney had represented
him although the attorney disclaimed any such relationship.
Although Ethical Consideration 5-18 of the Utah Code of
Professional

Responsibility

(1977)

states

that

an

attorney

representing a corporation or similar entity owes allegiance to the
entity rather than to its shareholders, in Margulies, the Court
modified that ethical consideration when the individual interests
of the limited partners are directly involved.

17

The Court found

that then there may be sufficient grounds

for implying the

existence of an attorney-client relationship.
In this case, Roland Holman was the president and major
stockholder of the corporation. Callister acted as counsel to the
corporation but also acted as counsel to Holman individually
insofar as he was jointly liable with the corporation.

After the

corporation was dissolved, Holman continued to do business as
Andersen's Ford, Inc., and Callister continued to act as counsel
thereto. It was Canister's negligence that caused Holman to incur
$75,000 in legal fees and $21,000 additional taxes. It would be an
effrontery to justice to deny both Holman and the dissolved
Corporation a remedy for the injury they have suffered as a result
of Callister's negligence.
Defendant further contended that even if Andersen's Ford,
Inc. is joined as a party plaintiff, the case must be dismissed
under the doctrine of res

judicata.

Defendant's argument that the

Plaintiff's claim was barred by res judicata
For a claim to be barred by res

is clearly misplaced.

judicata,

the prior claim

and the current claim must have involved the same parties, and the
first claim must have resulted in final judgment on the merits.
In order for a claim to be barred by res
judicata,
both the prior claim and the current claim must
meet three requirements: (1) both actions must
involve the same parties, their privies or
assignees; (2) the claim that is asserted to be
barred must have been presented or be such that it
could have been presented in the first case; and
(3) the first suit must have resulted in a final
judgment on the merits by a court of competent
jurisdiction.
D'Aston v. D'Aston, 844 P.2d 345 (Utah App. 1992).
18

Under D'Aston, the trial court erred when it found the
Holman case was barred under the doctrine of res

judicata

because

a question of fact was raised by the defendant as to whether
plaintiffs are the same party; second, the claim was not presented
in the first case; and third, there was no final judgment on the
merits.
CONCLUSION
The trial courts in both of these actions erred when they
dismissed the plaintiff's claims.

Plaintiff Company has both the

Utah Code and the Utah Constitution to support itself as a party
plaintiff in this legal malpractice action.

Plaintiff Holman has

case law to support himself as a party plaintiff in this legal
malpractice action.
that

this

Court

Plaintiff/Appellant respectfully requests

reverse

both

trial

judges' orders

granting

defendant's Motions to Dismiss and remand this matter for an
appropriate hearing.
Respectfully submitted this

day of August, 1994.

Richard C. Dibblee
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
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I hereby certify that on the

day of August, 1994, a

true and correct copy of the foregoing Brief of Appellant was
mailed, postage prepaid, to the following:
Stephen G. Morgan, Esq.
Cynthia K. C. Meyer, Esq.
MORGAN & HANSEN
Kearns Building, Eighth Floor
136 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ANDERSEN'S FORD, INC., a
Utah corporation/

COURT'S RULING

Plaintiff/

CASE NO. 930904013

vs.
CALLISTER/ DUNCAN & NEBEKER,
fka GREENE, CALLISTER &
NEBEKER, a Utah professional
corporation/
Defendant.

A Notice to Submit having been filed, pursuant to Rule 4-501,
Code of Judicial Administration, in connection with defendant's
Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment, the Court having
reviewed the Motion, Memorandum in support and Reply Memorandum and
the Memorandum in opposition, and the Court being fully advised and
finding good cause, rules as stated herein.
The Motion to Dismiss is granted. This Court finds that under
the

uncontroverted

facts,

the

plaintiff

corporation

was

involuntarily dissolved in September of 1982 and plaintiff's claim
arose after dissolution. This Court cannot conclude that "wind up"
actions include initiative litigation.

ANDERSEN'S FORD V.
CALLISTER, DUNCAN & NEBEKER

PAGE TWO

RULING

Counsel for defendant is to prepare an Order and detailed
Findings consistent with the material facts referenced in the
Memoranda, and consistent with this Ruling.
Dated this / '

day of November, 1993.

LESLIE A. LEWIS
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

ANDERSEN'S FORD V.
CALLISTER, DUNCAN & NEBEKER

PAGE TWO

RULING

MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct cgpy of the
foregoing Court's Ruling, to the following, this /

day of

November, 1993:

Richard C. Dibblee
Attorney for Plaintiff
10 West 300 South, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Stephen G. Morgan
Dennis R. James
Attorneys for Defendant
136 S. Main, 8th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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STEPHEN G. MORGAN, No. 2315
DENNIS R. JAMES, No. 1642
MORGAN & HANSEN
Attorneys for Defendant
Kearns Building, Eighth Floor
136 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 531-7888

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ANDERSEN'S FORD, INC., a Utah :
corporation,
:
:
Plaintiff,
:
vs.

:

CALLISTER, DUNCAN & NEBEKER,
fka GREENE, CALLISTER &
NEBEKER, a Utah professional
corporation,
Defendant.
The

STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

following

:
:
:
:
:
:

Civil No. 930904013
Judge Leslie A. Lewis

facts were undisputed

by the parties for

purposes of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss:
UNDISPUTED FACTS
1.

Plaintiff

Andersen's

Ford,

Inc.

is

a

former

Utah

corporation which had its principal place of business in Brigham
City, Utah.
2.

On

September

30,

1982, Andersen's

Ford,

Inc. was

involuntarily dissolved by the State of Utah for failure to pay
taxes.
3.

For the years 1980, 1981 and 1982, Plaintiff failed to

pay a portion of its federal withholding taxes owing to the IRS.

4.

Prior to May 2, 1983, Plaintiff retained and employed

Defendant to file and process a Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding in
the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah.
5.

On or about May 2, 1983, Defendant, by and through its

employees, filed on behalf of the Plaintiff the aforementioned
Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding as Case No. 83C-01222.
$•

Plaintiff

set

forth

in

its

Chapter

11

Plan

of

Reorganization Amended Disclosure Statement its purpose in filing
as follows:
2.11 The filing of Debtors Chapter 11 proceeding in
May 1983 was necessitated by actions being taken by the
Internal Revenue Service to seize and dispose of various
assets of the Debtor in an effort to reduce the outstanding for [sic] liability of the debtor for the period
of 1980-1982.
The tax liability is now to be paid
pursuant to the terms of Debtors Plan of Reorganization,
which will enable the Debtor to pay its delinquent taxes
in installments over a period of five years, while
maintaining itself as an ongoing, healthy business
operation in the meantime.
2.12 The Debtor believes that it has put itself on
a sound financial footing, through its reduced debt
structure and work force, that will allow it to more
easily deal with fluctuations in the national or local
economy. Debtor further submits that confirmation of the
Plan filed by the Debtor is not likely to be followed by
a liquidation of or need for further financial reorganization by the Debtor.
7.

The IRS filed a Proof of Claim, dated October 19, 1983,

in Plaintiff's bankruptcy proceeding

for taxes,

interest and

penalties owing for the years 1980, 1981 and 1982 in the amount of
approximately $154,004.83.
8.
1984,

The IRS filed an amended Proof of Claim, dated August 28,

in Plaintiff's bankruptcy proceeding for taxes, interest and
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penalties owing for the years 1980, 1981, and 1982 in the amount of
approximately $127,403.09.
9.

Plaintiff disputed the IRS's Proofs of Claim and filed an

Objection to the Amended Proof of Claim on August 29, 1984.
i#.

On October 4, 1984, the Bankruptcy Court entered an order

confirming Plaintiff's Second Amended Plan.
. t•'-

t&.

Pursuant to the confirmed Plan of Reorganization (the

"Plan"), Plaintiff was to make the following payments to IRS;
a.

On the first anniversary of the effective date, 20%

of its allowed claim plus accrued interest;
b.

On the second anniversary of the effective date, 20%

of its allowed claim plus accrued interest;
c.

On the third anniversary of the effective date, 20%

of its allowed claim plus accrued interest;
d.

On the fourth anniversary of the effective date, 20%

of its allowed claim plus accrued interest;
e.

On the fifth anniversary of the effective date, 20%

of its allowed claim plus accrued interest.
3^.

The IRS participated in the Plan confirmation hearing and

had knowledge of the terms and conditions of the Plan confirmed by
the Court.
y^.

At the time the Plan was confirmed, the amount of the

claim of the IRS against Plaintiff for unpaid taxes for the years
1980,

1981 and 1982 had not been resolved.

The Plan did not

specify the amount of tax liability Plaintiff owed for said years.
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14.

Both before and after the order confirming the Plan,

Plaintiff and the IRS had numerous communications and exchanged
information in an effort to determine Plaintiff's tax liability.
The IRS possessed all relevant information and facts regarding the
tax liability owed to it by Plaintiff.

The IRS also knew which

credits should have been applied to Plaintiff's account.
' j'k

1)5. On or about November 2, 1984, the IRS, through its agent

Clesse Hilton ("Hilton"), acting within the apparent scope of his
authority and with the approval of his supervisor, wrote a letter
("Hilton Letter") to Plaintiff in which the IRS stated, among other
things, that the balance due as of November 15, 1984, for tax and
accrued interest for the years 1980, 1981 and 1982 was $58,630.76.
The determination of this amount was based on Hilton's independent
review of the account records and documents reflecting taxes owing
and payments made, and upon information supplied to Hilton by
Plaintiff.
ljfc. By the Hilton Letter the IRS also agreed to abate all
penalties for tax years 1980, 1981 and 1982, upon payment of
$58,630.76, together with interest.
1*7. The amount set forth in the Hilton Letter was not the
result of an attempt on Hilton's part to compromise Plaintiff's
liability, but was his independent determination of the actual
amount of tax and interest due.

He was authorized to abate

penalties upon payment of the tax and interest in full.
ltk

Plaintiff accepted the amounts set forth in the Hilton
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Letter as the actual amount it owed because the sums represented
came within $1,000.00 of the amount Plaintiff calculated that it
owed to the IRS.
I

19^

On or about April 16, 1985, Robert S. Prince ("Prince"),

the attorney employed by Defendant and handling the Chapter 11
Bankruptcy

for Plaintiff, telephoned

the

IRS to confirm the

agreement evidenced by the Hilton Letter.

The IRS through its

agent James Richards ("Richards"), acting within the scope of his
apparent authority, wrote a letter to Prince in which the IRS
stated, among other things, that the balance due as of April 15,
1985, for taxes and interest for the years 1980, 1981 and 1982 was
$61,715.41.

Although Prince did not specifically refer to the

Hilton Letter during the phone call, the figure quoted by Richards
represented the amount set forth in the Hilton Letter, plus accrued
interest.
7fa.

On or about April 17, 1985, Prince sent a letter to the

IRS in which he confirmed that the balance owing as of April 15,
1985, for taxes assessed during 1980, 1981 and 1982 was $61,715.41.
Prince reiterated the agreement that upon payment of said sum all
pre-petition tax liability of Plaintiff would be satisfied.
2X.

The IRS did not respond or object to Prince's April 17,

1985 letter.
22.

After the agreement evidenced by the Hilton Letter was

reached between Plaintiff and the IRS, Plaintiff made payments to
the IRS that it intended to be applied according to the Plan and
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the agreement.
2^.

Plaintiff made its first payment in August of 1985 in the

/

amount of $40,000. The payment prepaid the obligation according to
the terms of the payment schedule in the confirmed plan. Plaintiff
paid an additional $15,000 to the IRS in December of 1988.
2^.

Between 1985 and 1990, the IRS did not declare a default

or otherwise indicate to Plaintiff that it was in default under the
Plan or that the IRS expected payment to have been made immediately
after the agreement was reached in November 1984.
^5.

On several occasions between 1984 and mid-1990, the IRS

attempted to collect the tax liability owed by Plaintiff or from
Roland Holman, an officer of Plaintiff, as a responsible party.
Each time the IRS was informed that Plaintiff was paying according
to the Hilton Letter and the Plan.
The

IRS maintained

an

active

collection

ledger

on

Plaintiff between 1984 and 1990, with a variety of agents responsible for monitoring the account.
itf'.

Clark Hoi felt z ("Holfeltz") , a revenue agent, reviewed

the collection on the account in 1988. He suspected that certain
of

the

payments

had

been

misapplied

Plaintiff had complied with the Plan.

and

questioned

whether

Holfeltz reconciled the

account and no notice of default was served upon Plaintiff.
28.

Plaintiff received a letter dated October 27, 1990,

wherein the IRS informed Plaintiff that it had recomputed Plaintiffs tax liability and $127,644.31 was due on the alleged default
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of the Chapter 11 Plan.

The IRS also demanded payment of the new

amount and threatened to pursue a motion to set aside the order of
confirmation or move to convert the case to a Chapter 7.

After

October 27, 1990, the IRS posited a variety of other figures
representing the amount due based on various methods of applying
payments made on the debt.
29.

Plaintiff brought an action for declaratory relief and

injunction against the IRS in the United States Bankruptcy Court
for the State of Utah, Central Division, Case No. 83C-01222 (the
"Declaratory Judgment Action") to have Plaintiff's obligation to
the IRS declared to be paid in full and to enjoin further collection efforts.

M
because

The IRS alleged in its Trial Brief in that case that
Plaintiff breached

its agreement with the IRS

(even

assuming the enforceability of the Hilton Letter and of the payment
schedule under the Plan) by failing to make the agreed to payments,
it was entitled to renew its claim to the full tax liability of the
Plaintiff, including penalties and interest.
31.

Plaintiff prevailed in the Declaratory Judgment Action,

the court there ruling that the Hilton Letter was binding on the
IRS.
32.

In spite of the favorable result, Plaintiff brought this

action to attempt to recover from Defendant its fees and costs
incurred in pursuing the Declaratory Judgment Action.
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The Plaintiff corporation was involuntarily dissolved in

September of 1982.
2.

Plaintiff's claim arose after dissolution.

3.

Plaintiff's claims cannot be considered "wind-up" actions

of a corporation.
DATED this

day of November, 1993.
BY THE COURT:

HONORABLE LESLIE A. LEWIS
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

APPROVED AS TO FORM;

RICHARD C. DIBBLEE
Attorney for Plaintiff
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STEPHEN G. MORGAN, No. 2315
DENNIS R. JAMES, No. 1642
MORGAN & HANSEN
Attorneys for Defendant
Kearns Building, Eighth Floor
136 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 531-7888
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ANDERSEN'S FORD, INC., a Utah
corporation,
ORDER
Plaintiff,
vs.
CALLISTER, DUNCAN & NEBEKER,
fka GREENE, CALLISTER &
NEBEKER, a Utah professional
corporation,

Civil No. 930904013
Judge Leslie A. Lewis

Defendant.
Based on the Undisputed Facts and the Conclusions of Law,
Defendant's Motion for Dismissal is granted and Plaintiff's action
is hereby dismissed with prejudice.
DATED this

day of November, 1993.
BY THE COURT:

JUDGE LESLIE A. LEWIS
THIRD DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

RICHARD C. DIBBLEE
Attorney for Plaintiff
C:\WP51\ANDERSEN\4198.0R

CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY
I certify that on this.oQ

day of November, 1993, I caused a

true and correct copy of the foregoing STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED
FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to be hand delivered to the following:
Richard C, Dibblee
Attorney for Plaintiff
10 West 300 South, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, UT 84101

{'•?'<••'*-
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STEPHEN G. MORGAN, No. 2 315
CYNTHIA K.C. MEYER, No. 5050
MORGAN & HANSEN
Kearns Building, Eighth Floor
136 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 531-7888
Attorneys for Defendant
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ROLAND HOLMAN, an individual, :
dba Andersen's Ford, Inc.,
:
:
Plaintiff,
:
vs.

STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

:

CALLISTER, DUNCAN & NEBEKER,
fka GREENE, CALLISTER &
NEBEKER, a Utah professional
corporation,
Defendant.

:
:
:
:
:

Civil No. 940900147
Judge David S. Young

This matter came before the Court on Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment.

The Court

considered the Motion and Memorandum filed by Defendant, Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition and the Affidavit of Roland Holman,
as well as Defendant's Reply Memorandum.

The Court denied the

parties' requests for oral argument pursuant to Rule 4-501(3)(c) of
the Utah Code of Judicial Administration.
The

following

facts were undisputed

purposes of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss:

by the parties for

STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS
1.

Andersen's Ford, Inc. is a former Utah corporation which

had its principal place of business in Brigham City, Utah,
2.

On

September

30,

1982,

Andersen's

Ford,

Inc.

was

involuntarily dissolved by the State of Utah for failure to pay
taxes.
3.
employees,

On or about May 2, 1983, Defendant, by and through its
filed

on

behalf

of

Andersen's

Ford

a

Chapter

11

Bankruptcy Petition as Case No. 83C-01222.
4.

For the years 1980, 1981 and 1982, Andersen's Ford failed

to pay a portion of its federal withholding taxes owing to the IRS.
5.

The IRS filed a Proof of Claim, dated October 19, 1983,

in Andersen's Ford's bankruptcy proceeding for taxes, interest and
penalties owing for the years 1980, 1981 and 1982 in the amount of
approximately $154,004.83.
6.
1984,

The IRS filed an amended Proof of Claim, dated August 28,
in

Andersen's

Ford's

bankruptcy

proceeding

for

taxes,

interest and penalties owing for the years 1980, 1981, and 1982 in
the amount of approximately $127,4 03.09.
7.

Andersen's Ford disputed the IRS's Proofs of Claim and

filed an Objection to the Amended Proof of Claim on August 29,
1984.
8.

On October 4, 1984, the Bankruptcy Court entered an order

confirming Andersen's Ford's Second Amended Plan of Reorganization
(the "Plan").
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9.

Pursuant to the confirmed Plan, Andersen's Ford was to

make the following payments to IRS;
a.

On the first anniversary of the effective date, 20%

of its allowed claim plus accrued interest;
b.

On the second anniversary of the effective date, 20%

of its allowed claim plus accrued interest;
c.

On the third anniversary of the effective date, 20%

of its allowed claim plus accrued interest;
d.

On the fourth anniversary of the effective date, 20%

of its allowed claim plus accrued interest;
e.

On the fifth anniversary of the effective date, 20%

of its allowed claim plus accrued interest.
10.

The IRS participated in the Plan confirmation hearing and

had knowledge of the terms and conditions of the Plan confirmed by
the Court.
11.

At the time the Plan was confirmed, the amount of the

claim of the IRS against Andersen's Ford for unpaid taxes for the
years 1980, 1981 and 1982 had not been resolved.

The Plan did not

specify the amount of tax liability Andersen's Ford owed for said
years.
12.
Andersen's

Both before and after the order confirming the Plan,
Ford

and the IRS had numerous communications and

exchanged information in an effort to determine Andersen's Ford's
tax liability.

The IRS possessed all relevant information and

facts regarding the tax liability owed to it by Andersen's Ford.
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The

IRS

also knew which

credits

should

have been

applied

to

Andersen's Ford's account.
13.

On or about November 2, 1984, the IRS, through its agent

Clesse Hilton ("Hilton"), acting within the apparent scope of his
authority and with the approval of his supervisor, wrote a letter
("Hilton Letter") to Andersen's Ford in which the IRS stated, among
other things, that the balance due as of November 15, 1984, for tax
and

accrued

$58,630.76.

interest

for

the

years

1980,

1981

and

1982

was

The determination of this amount was based on Hilton's

independent review of the account records and documents reflecting
taxes owing and payments made, and upon information supplied to
Hilton by Andersen's Ford.
14.
penalties

By the Hilton Letter the IRS also agreed to abate all
for tax years

1980, 1981 and

1982, upon payment of

$58,630.76, together with interest.
15.

The amount set forth in the Hilton Letter was not the

result of an attempt on Hilton's part to compromise Andersen's
Ford's liability, but was his independent determination of the
actual amount of tax and interest due.

He was authorized to abate

penalties upon payment of the tax and interest in full.
16.

Plaintiff accepted the amounts set forth in the Hilton

Letter as the actual amount it owed because the sums represented
came within $1,000.00 of the amount Andersen's Ford calculated that
it owed to the IRS.
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17.

On or about April 16, 1985, Robert S. Prince ("Prince"),

the attorney employed by Defendant and handling the Chapter 11
Bankruptcy for Andersenfs Ford, telephoned the IRS to confirm the
agreement evidenced by the Hilton Letter.

The IRS through its

agent James Richards ("Richards"), acting within the scope of his
apparent authority, wrote a letter to Prince in which the IRS
stated, among other things, that the balance due as of April 15,
1985,

for taxes and interest for the years 1980, 1981 and 1982 was

$61,715.41.

Although Prince did not specifically refer to the

Hilton Letter during the phone call, the figure quoted by Richards
represented the amount set forth in the Hilton Letter, plus accrued
interest.
18.

On or about April 17, 1985, Prince sent a letter to the

IRS in which he confirmed that the balance owing as of April 15,
1985,

for taxes assessed during 1980, 1981 and 1982 was $61,715.41.

Prince reiterated the agreement that upon payment of said sum all
pre-petition tax liability of Andersen's Ford would be satisfied.
19.

The IRS did not respond or object to Prince's April 17,

1985 letter.
20.

After the agreement evidenced by the Hilton Letter was

reached between Andersen's Ford and the IRS, Andersen's Ford made
payments to the IRS that it intended to be applied according to the
Plan and the agreement.
21.

Andersen's Ford made its first payment in August of 1985

in the amount of $40,000.
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according to the terms of the payment schedule in the confirmed
plan.

Andersen's Ford paid an additional $15,000 to the IRS in

December of 1988.
22.

Between 1985 and 1990, the IRS did not declare a default

or otherwise indicate to Andersen's Ford that it was in default
under the Plan or that the IRS expected payment to have been made
immediately after the agreement was reached in November 1984.
23.

On several occasions between 1984 and mid-1990, the IRS

attempted to collect the tax liability owed by Andersen's Ford from
Roland Holman, an officer of Andersen's Ford, Inc., as a responsible party. Each time the IRS was informed that Andersen's Ford was
paying according to the Hilton Letter and the Plan.
24.

The

IRS maintained

an

active

collection

ledger

on

Andersen's Ford between 1984 and 1990, with a variety of agents
responsible for monitoring the account.
25.

Clark Holfeltz ("Holfeltz"), a revenue agent, reviewed

the collection on the account in 1988. He suspected that certain
of

the

payments

had

been

misapplied

and

Andersen's Ford had complied with the Plan.

questioned

whether

Holfeltz reconciled

the account and no notice of default was served upon Andersen's
Ford.
26.

In 1990, the IRS took the position that because Ander-

sen's Ford breached its agreement with the IRS (even assuming the
enforceability of the Hilton Letter and of the payment schedule
under the Plan) by failing to make the agreed to payments, it was
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entitled to renew its claim to the full tax liability of Andersenfs
Ford, including penalties and interest.
27.

Andersen's Ford received a letter dated October 27, 1990,

wherein the IRS informed Andersen's Ford that it had recomputed
Andersen's Ford's tax liability and $127,644.31 was due on the
alleged default of the Chapter 11 Plan.

The IRS also demanded

payment of the new amount and threatened to pursue a motion to set
aside the order of confirmation or move to convert the case to a
Chapter 7.

After October 27, 1990, the IRS posited a variety of

other figures representing the amount due based on various methods
of applying payments made on the debt.
28.

Andersen's Ford brought an action for declaratory relief

and injunction against the IRS in the United States Bankruptcy
Court for the State of Utah, Central Division, Case No. 83C-01222
(the "Declaratory Judgment Action") to have Andersen's Ford's
obligation to the IRS declared to be paid in full and to enjoin
further collection efforts.
29.

Andersen's Ford prevailed in the Declaratory Judgment

Action, the court there ruling that the Hilton Letter was binding
on the IRS.
30.

In spite of the favorable result, Andersen's Ford brought

the action in Civil No. 930904013 to attempt to recover from
Defendant its fees and costs incurred in pursuing the Declaratory
Judgment Action.
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31.

Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss, or, in the Alterna-

tive, for Summary Judgment in Civil No. 930904013, which was
granted.
32.
No.

Despite the fact that Andersen's Ford's action in Civil

930904013 was dismissed with prejudice, Plaintiff herein,

Roland Holman, filed a Complaint in this case alleging that since
the corporation, Andersen's Ford, was dissolved on September 30,
1982, Holman continued to operate the business under the trade name
of Andersen's Ford, Inc., and to "remain a client of the Defendant."
33.

Plaintiff herein, Roland Holman, was a creditor of

Andersen's Ford, Inc.
34.

Plaintiff herein was represented to be an officer and

director of Andersen's Ford in Andersen's Ford's bankruptcy.
35.

The Second Amended Plan of Reorganization contained a

provision preventing the Internal Revenue Service from proceeding
against Roland Holman to collect taxes, penalties or interest owed
by Andersen's Ford, so long as Andersen's Ford was current on all
payments owed to the IRS under the Plan.
36.

The Second Amended Plan of Reorganization was signed by

Roland Holman in his capacity as President of Andersen's Ford, Inc.
The signature block appears as follows on the Second Amended Plan:
ANDERSEN'S FORD, INC.

By:
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Although Plaintiff disputes the following facts, the Court
rules that there is no genuine issue as to the following, based on
the materials submitted by the parties. Roland Holman's affidavit
does not place the following facts in issue.

In his Affidavit,

Holman states he was virtually the sole shareholder of Andersen's
Ford and directed Andersen's Ford's activities.

Those facts do

not, however, place in issue the following facts:
37.

Prior to May 2, 1983, Andersen's Ford retained and

employed Defendant to file and process a Chapter 11 bankruptcy
proceeding in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District
of Utah.
38.

It was the corporation, Andersen's Ford, Inc., and not

Roland Holman, who remained a client of Defendant, and it was
Andersen's Ford, Inc. on whose behalf Defendant filed a Chapter 11
Petition in Bankruptcy.
Based on the foregoing undisputed facts, the Court enters the
following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Andersen's Ford, and not Plaintiff Roland Holman, is the

real party in interest in this matter, and is an indispensable
party to this action since it was the client of Defendant and owns
any legal malpractice claim.
2.

Even if Andersen's Ford had been joined as a party

plaintiff, the case would necessarily be dismissed based on the
doctrine of res judicata, since Andersen's Ford's identical action
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against

Defendant

was

dismissed

with

prejudice

in

Case

No.

930904013, Third District Court for Salt Lake County.
3.

The Court should enter an Order dismissing Plaintiff's

complaint with prejudice, and as such, the Court does not reach
Defendant's alternative motion for summary judgment on the merits
of the legal malpractice claim.
DATED this

day of April, 1994.
BY THE COURT:

HONORABLE DAVID S. YOUNG
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

RICHARD C. DIBBLEE
Attorney for Plaintiff

C:\WP51\ANDERSEN\4198A.FF

10

CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY
I certify that on this O ^ — d a y of April, 1994, I caused the
original of the foregoing proposed STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to be hand delivered to the following for
his approval as to form:
Richard C. Dibblee
Attorney for Plaintiff
10 West 300 South, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
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